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THE IMPERIAL SCHOLAR REVISITED: HOW TO
MARGINALIZE OUTSIDER WRITING, TEN YEARS LATER
RICHARD DELGADOt
INTRODUCTION
Ten years ago I began writing an article, The Imperial Scholar:
Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature,1 that became one of
the more controversial pieces of its time. It has been cited more
than fifty times, as often without approval as with. Even as
sympathetic a coreligionist as Derrick Bell describes the article as
"Can intellectual hand grenade, tossed over the wall of the establish-
ment as a form of academic protest.
'"'2
In it, I showed that an inner circle of twenty-six scholars, all
male and white, occupied the central arenas of civil rights scholar-
ship to the exclusion of contributions of minority scholars.3 When
a member of this inner circle wrote about civil rights issues he cited
almost exclusively to other members of the circle for support.4 I
argued that this exclusion of minority scholars' writings about key
issues of race law caused the literature dealing with race, racism,
and American law to be blunted, skewed, and riddled with omis-
sions.5  Among the reasons for the curious citation practices I
discovered were (1) the mistaken belief that minority authors who
write about racial issues are not objective, (2) the mainstream
t Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of
Law; J.D. 1974, University of California School of Law (Boalt Hall). I gratefully
acknowledge the suggestions and assistance of Kelly Robinson, Pierre Schlag, Erich
Schwiesow, and Jean Stefancic in writing this Article.
1 Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights
Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561 (1984) [hereinafter The Imperial Scholar]. For a
recent article in a similar vein, see Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Legal Scholarship, 77
IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 1992).
2Jon Wiener, Law Profs Fight the Power, 249 NATION 246, 246 (1989) (quoting
Derrick Bell).
s See The Imperial Scholar, supra note 1, at 562 n.3 (listing the 26 most-cited
authors and their representative works).
" See id. at 563 ("Paul Brest cites Laurence Tribe. Laurence Tribe cites Paul Brest
and Owen Fiss. Owen Fiss cites Bruce Ackerman, who cites Paul Brest and Frank
Michelman, who cites Owen Fiss and Laurence Tribe and Kenneth Karst....").
' See id. at 567 (listing lack of information, decreased or misdirected passion,
differing agendas, incomplete commitment to remedies, unconscious perpetuation of
stereotypes, and continued dependency as reasons why minority scholarship or
minority rights cannot be ignored).
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writers' need to remain in control, thus ensuring that legal change
does not occur too quickly, and (3) the sense of personal satisfaction
resulting from being at the forefront of a powerful social move-
ment.
6
I concluded that article by urging minority students and teachers
to question insistently and to improve upon the unsatisfactory
scholarship produced by the inner circle, and by encouraging white
liberal authors to redirect their energies towards other areas.
7
Although the article provoked a storm when it appeared, many of
its premises and assertions seem commonplace today.
8
This Article is a sequel to The Imperial Scholar. In it, I address
the "second generation" question: What happens when a group of
insurgent scholars gains admission, gets inside the door, earns the
credibility and credentials that warrant consideration by mainstream
scholars? Are these new scholars promptly granted equal standing,
integrated fully into the conversations, colloquies, footnotes, and
exchanges that constitute legal-academic discourse on issues of race
and equality? Or, are they still marginalized, muffled, and kept in
limbo-to be seen, perhaps, but not heard?9
To focus the inquiry, I limit my examination to two groups of
insurgent scholars, Critical Race Theorists and radical feminists.
These scholars were barely beginning to make themselves heard,
were still marginal to the mainstream discourse, at the time The
Imperial Scholar was written. Currently, members of these groups
teach at the top law schools and publish in the best law reviews.
10
Their work is subject to commentary by distinguished colleagues
6 See id. at 573-78.
7 See id. at 577.
8 An example is the assertion that perspective matters-who is writing may be as
important as what is written. See e.g., Symposium, Excluded Voices: Realities in Law
and Law Reform, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 1 (1987) (describing the symposium as being
"about how differences in opinions, motivations, and language can construct social
and political ideas that may form the basis for law reform"); Symposium, Legal
Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073 (1989) (containing articles by Milner S. Ball,
Derrick Bell, Richard Delgado, Mari J. Matsuda, Patricia Williams, and Steven L.
Winter on the place of voice and perspective in legal scholarship). But see Stephen
L. Carter, Academic Tenure and "White Male" Standards: Some Lessons from the Patent
Law, 100 YALE LJ. 2065, 2067 (1991) (disagreeing with the view that the identity of
the author is relevant to considering the scholarship produced).
9 See. e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Bakke, Minority Admissions, and the Usual Price of
Racial Remedies, 67 CAL. L. REV. 3, 4 (1979) (comparing the exclusion of minorities
from civil rights scholarship to parents who tell their children: "Keep quiet. We are
talking about you, not to you.").
10 See infra note 15.
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and critics in top reviews,11 and their controversies are covered by
the New York Times and The Nation.12 Even if not in the living
room, they are plainly somewhere "inside the door." What
reception are they receiving?
Part I of this Article examines their treatment at the hands of
the original twenty-six "imperial scholars." Has this group's citation
practice changed, now recognizing the new voices, perhaps as a
result of reading works such as The Imperial Scholar? Part II then
examines how the two insurgent groups are cited by mainstream
scholars generally.
My conclusion is that mainstream figures who control the terms
of discourse marginalize outsider writing as long as possible. In
what follows I do not attempt to "prove" that this conclusion is
correct as such. Rather, I simply catalogue the panoply of mecha-
nisms employed by mainstream writers to cope with and keep at a
distance outsider scholarship they find threatening. Although
examples of each such mechanism are provided, they are not
multiplied unnecessarily.13 My intent is not to bring all the guilty
parties immediately to justice; some may yet reform themselves.
Indeed, it is my hope that this Article will provide the occasion for
mainstream writers who recognize themselves in its pages to
reevaluate their scholarly practices with respect to insurgent
scholars. At the same time, I hope it will assist insurgent scholars
in articulating their criticisms of unregenerate attempts to keep
them on the margin.
The continued marginalization of outsider scholars, while
perhaps distressing for the cause of social reform, should not come
as a surprise. It is what we might expect from our studies of
narrative theory paradigm shifting, concepts described in Part m.
Reform tends to be slow and incremental; new knowledge strikes us
11 See, e.g., Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1745 (1989) (commending Critical Race Theorists for their intellectual
contributions to academia but taking issue with the manner in which they present
their arguments).
12 For coverage of Critical Race Theorists, see Charles Rothfeld, Minority Critic
Stirs Debate on Minority Writing, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 5, 1990, at B9 (describing the
controversy created by Randall Kennedy's critique of critical race studies); Wiener,
supra note 2. For an example of coverage of radical feminism, see Fred Strebeigh,
Defining Law on the Feminist Frontier, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 6, 1991, § 6 (Magazine), at 29
(describing the work of Catharine A. MacKinnon).
13 They certainly could have been; the reader, however, having become
consciously aware of these mechanisms, will be able to find them on her own all too
easily.
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as extreme, coercive, "political," or strange. Yet even if natural, this
resistance proves self-defeating, depriving us of points of view that
we need for a more comprehensive view of the world. Sometimes,
though, I suspect hat resistance is based upon sloth, entrenchment,
or sheer hostility to that which is new. Whatever its cause, the
phenomenon is widespread enough to suggest that without real
effort on our part resistance to reform may become a standard
feature of our intellectual landscape.
I. WAYS OF COPING
This Part describes the ways in which the group of twenty-six
scholars examined in The Imperial Scholar14 have dealt with the
growing body of outsider writing. There I showed that when the
insurgents begin knocking at the door, they are ignored as long as
possible. Once they gain admission,15 the situation becomes more
14 See The Imperial Scholar, supra note 1, at 562 n.3 (studying the citation practices
of Bruce A. Ackerman, Alexander M. Bickel, Boris 1. Bittker, Charles L. Black, Jr.,
Vincent Blasi, Paul Brest, Archibald Cox, Theodore EisenbergJohn H. Ely, Owen M.
Fiss, Lino A. Graglia, Kent Greenawalt, Gerald Gunther, William E. Hellerstein, Louis
Henkin, Harold W. Horowitz, John Kaplan, Kenneth L. Karst, Frank I. Michelman,
Robert M. O'Neil, Louis H. Pollak, Terrance Sandalow, Theodore J. St. Antoine,
Laurence Tribe, William Van Alstyne, and Herbert Wechsler). New entrants not
considered in The Imperial Scholar will be examined later; their work represents ome
of the most interesting and subtle ways of marginalizing outsider scholarship. See
infra Part H.
15 Outsiders currently have a substantial presence in "elite" law reviews. Of the
articles on civil rights published in three top journals, the Harvard Law Review, the
Yale Law Journal, and the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, between 1985 and
1990, nearly three-fourths were written by women or people of color. See, e.g., Robin
D. Barnes, Race Consciousness: The Thematic Content of Racial Distinctiveness in Critical
Race Scholarship, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1864 (1990); Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court 1984
Term, Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1985); Derrick Bell
& Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial Politics, 97 YALE L.J. 1609 (1988);
Scott Brewer, Introduction: Choosing Sides in the Racial Critiques Debate, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1844 (1990); Lea Brilmayer, Carolene Conflicts, and the Fate of the "Inside-
Outsider," 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1291 (1986); Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen to
be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420 (1988); Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Race Reform, and
Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV.
L. REv. 1331 (1988); Drew S. Days, III, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453 (1987); Richard
Delgado, Derrick Bell and the Ideology of Racial Reform: Will We EverBe Saved?, 97 YALE
L.J. 923 (1988); Richard Delgado, Mindset and Metaphor, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1872
(1990); Leslie G. Espinoza, Masks and Other Disguises: Exposing Legal Academia, 103
HARv. L. REv. 1878 (1990); Susan R. Estrich & Kathleen M. Sullivan, Abortion Politics:
Writingfor an Audience of One, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 119 (1989); A. Leon Higginbotham,
Jr., The Life of the Law: Values, Commitmen and Craftsmanship, 100 HARV. L. REV. 795
(1987); Randall Kennedy, A Reply to Philip Elman, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1938 (1987);
Randall Kennedy, Martin Luther King's Constitution: A Legal Histoqy of the Montgomely
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complex. Some inner circle writers abandon the field. Others
remain, but retain the habit of ignoring scholarship they wish not
to recognize. Still others use a series of mechanisms to muffle and
tame the new, divergent scholarship. Finally, some members of the
inner circle have begun to integrate the outsiders' scholarship into
their own writing and thought.
A. Abandonment of the Field
Most civil rights writing published in the top law reviews these
days is written by women and minorities.1 6 As new writers have
entered the field, established ones have either reduced their
production or left the field entirely. What Judge Wyzanski called
the "minstrel show" 7 -black rights being enforced and interpreted
by white men-is finally coming to an end. Part of the abandonment
is simply due to increasing age: some of the great names of ten
years ago have died or retired.18 Others are moving into the
Bus Boycott, 98 YALE L.J. 999 (1989); Randall L. Kennedy, McClesky v. Kemp: Race,
Capital Punishmen and the Supreme Court, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1388 (1988); Randall
Kennedy, Persuasion andDistrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARV.
L. REV. 1327 (1986); Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial
Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of
Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1750 (1990); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of
Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 78 (1986);
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1415 (1989); Lea
S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 437
(1989); Robin West, Law, Rights, and Other Totemic Illusions: Legal Liberalism and
Freud's Theory of the Rule of Law, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 817 (1986).
The list above includes articles published by minorities and women (on the
subjects in question) in only three of the top law reviews. Their entire output is, of
course, much larger. THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAw ScHooLs, AALS
DIRECTORY OF LAW TEAcHERS 1990-91 (1990) [hereinafter AALS DIRECTORY] lists 610
minority law professors. See id. at 1127-30. Although no precise figures exist, I
estimate that at least half are teaching or writing in the areas of constitutional law or
minority rights. The number of women in legal academia is much larger-currently
about 23% of the law professoriate. See Telephone Interview with Kathy Grove,
American Bar Association (Nov. 25, 1991); see also Paul M. George & Susan
McGlamery, Women and Legal Scholarship: A Bibliography, 77 IOWA L. REV.
(forthcoming 1992) (listing feminist legal works).
16 See supra note 15 (noting that women and people of color wrote nearly three-
fourths of civil rights scholarship appearing in the Harvard Law Review, Yale Law
Journal, and University of Pennsylvania Law Review from 1985 to 1990).
17 Western Addition Community Org. v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917, 940 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (Wyzanski, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western
Addition Co., 420 U.S. 50 (1975), quoted in The Imperial Scholar, supra note 1, at 577-
78. On the show's death, at least in a numerical sense, see supra note 15.
" According to the latest AALS Directoiy, of the original 26, Bittker, Black, Cox,
Henkin, Pollak, and Wechsler have retired or left full-time teaching; Brest, Blasi, and
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golden part of their careers in which heavily documented and
supported scholarship can give way to "reflections," opinion pieces,
and musings that rely not on the careful analysis and painstaking
research of traditional articles but on the strength of a reputation
built by such analysis and research.19 The aging of the inner circle
alone, however, does not account for the entire shift in the
demographics of authorship on race or gender and the law.
Rather, many inner-circle writers have moved to other fields.
20
Perhaps they do not see race and women's issues as the urgent
topics they were in the 1960s and 70s. Many are now writing about
jurisprudence, federal courts, constitutional interpretation, and
strict construction, issues our more conservative times have placed
on the front burner.21 In the case of some, it could be argued that
they moved on to bigger and better things.
22
It may be, as well, that as the recognition of female and minority
voices increases, some members of the inner circle find their efforts
neither as necessary nor as productive as they once were. When a
middle-class, white male scholar sees articles written by outsider
Horowitz are administrators; and Bickel is dead. See AALS DIRECTORY, supra note 15.
19 See, e.g., Charles L. Black,Jr., My World with Louis Armstrong, 95 YALE L.J. 1595
(1986) (discussing personal reflections on race discrimination in the South); Charles
L. Black,Jr., Reflections on Teaching and Working in Constitutional Law, 66 OR. L. REV.
1 (1987) (commenting on human rights, the Constitution, and the powers of the
presidency); Robert M. O'Neil, Preferential Admissions Revisited: Some Reflection on
DeFunis and Bakke, 14J.C. & U.L. 423 (1987) (discussing the history of and legal
approaches to preferential admissions).
20 Compare Archibald Cox, The Supreme Cour 1965 Term-Foreword: Constitutional
Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91 (1966)
(discussing the need for judicial activism in protection of minorities' interests) with
Archibald Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism or Self Restraint?, 47
MD. L. REv. 118 (1987) (same, but emphasizing institutional roles and concerns);
compare also John H. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U.
CH. L. REV. 723 (1974) (offering theory to justify affirmative action) withJohn H. Ely,
Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a World Where Courts Are No
Different from Legislatures, 77 VA. L. REV. 833 (1991) (discussing institutional
limitations on federal judges' activism).
21 See supra note 20 (comparing Cox's and Ely's shifts in scholarship over time).
The works of Bruce Ackerman, Vincent Blasi, Owen Fiss, Gerald Gunther, and
Terrance Sandalow also illustrate this shift. The LegalTrac database shows Blasi
publishing eight articles since 1984, all on constitutional law subjects or federalism;
none deal expressly with the rights of women or minorities. For Ackerman the
figures are nine (other subjects), one (rights of minorities); for Fiss, 16 (other
subjects), one (rights of minorities); for Gunther, 11 (other subjects), one (rights of
minorities); for Sandalow, 11 (other subjects), one (rights of minorities).
22 For example, political theory and legal culture are two areas to which Ackerman
and Ely have addressed their formidable talents. See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE
THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991);JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
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scholars published in the top law reviews, he may well ask himself
why he should continue writing about those same issues, with which
he has a much more tenuous connection. Perhaps he wrote, ih part,
out of generosity or a sense of social obligation. Now that others
have taken up the torch, his efforts may seem less necessary.
The field of civil rights has not been given over entirely to
minority and feminist scholars, however. Nor am I arguing that it
should be. For one thing, white males are affected to some degree
by issues of racial justice.23 Moreover, we certainly do not need
ghettoization; the cross-fertilization resulting from integrated
scholarship can be as beneficial as recognition of long-neglected
voices. The inner-circle writers who continue to write about civil
rights are examined next.
B. Those Who Stayed
The original inner-circle scholars who continue to write about
civil rights can be divided into three subgroups according to their
treatment of the new scholarship. Some have proceeded as they
always did, virtually oblivious to the voices of those who are in many
ways the subjects of the imperialists' writing. These scholars I call
the Unconverted. A second, more interesting group has acknowl-
edged the insurgent scholarship and developed an arsenal of
mechanisms for taming and restructuring it. These are the Latter-
Day Imperialists. The third group recognizes the outsider scholars,
agreeing and disagreeing with them as they do with their inner-
circle colleagues. This is the Road to Damascus group, for they
have seen the light.
1. The Unconverted
A few from the original group of writers continue to ignore the
new voices of color and the feminists. This practice leads to many
of the scholarly deficiencies I noted several years ago, deficiencies
extending far beyond failure to give recognition when it is due.
24
23 See e.g., Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972) (granting
tenants who alleged they lost the benefits of living in an integrated community
standing to sue for race discrimination under Title VIII regardless of their color); City
of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (disallowing minority set-asides
unless the city has previously discriminated against the minority group, which
implicitly recognizes the "innocent whites" argument against affirmative action).
24 See The Imperial Scholar, supra note 1, at 567-73 (detailing distortions, skewings,
and omissions in the civil rights literature).
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Van Alstyne, for example, in a recent article on the right to an
abortion,25 slights feminist analysis and describes the woman's
interest as lacking any constitutional or moral foundation.26 He
frames the issue as the right to destroy third-party life,27 cites
mainly male authorities,28 and gives short shrift to feminist
commentators, mentioning but three in passing footnotes.
29
Others do cite the new literature but opt for the most familiar,
and perhaps safest, versions. For example, when Laurence Tribe
writes of the critique of constitutional determinacy, he often refers
to writers such as Mark Tushnet, ignoring the more pointed
criticisms by feminists such as Catharine MacKinnon and Critical
Race Theorists such as Derrick Bell.30 This results in a softened
25 See William Van Alstyne, Closing the Circle of Constitutional Review from Griswold
v. Connecticut to Roe v. Wade: An Outline of a Decision Merely Overruling Roe, 1989
DUKE L.J. 1677.
26 See id. at 1679-80 (describing the right recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), as a right "to destroy third-party life that one's own acts... had brought
about," and claiming that such a right could "gain no constitutional purchase"
irrespective of how it was described).
2 See id. at 1680-82, 1685, 1688.
28 See id. at 1677 n.1, 1681 n.15.
2 See id. at 1677 n.1 (referring to Estrich & Sullivan, supra note 15, as a "strong
follow-on article" to Walter Dellinger & Gene B. Sperling, Abortion and the Supreme
Court: The Retreat from Roe v. Wade, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 83 (1989), the article that
prompted Van Alstyne's own writing); id. at 1685 n.30 (citing Fran Olsen, Unraveling
Compromise, 103 HARV. L. REV. 105, 117-26 (1989), as additional support for the
proposition that men favor legalized abortion more than women); id. at 1687 n.38
(citingJudith Thompson, A Defense ofAbortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47 (1971), for the
existence of arguments based on the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition on
involuntary servitude, but declaring such arguments irrelevant to pregnancies
resulting from consensual intercourse).
30 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrruTIoNAL LAw 13 n.9 (2d ed. 1988)
(citing only Mark V. Tushnet, A Note on the Revival of Textualism in Constitutional
Theory, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 683, 685 (1985), for the idea of constitutional indetermina-
cy); Laurence H. Tribe, On Reading the Constitution, 1988 UTAH L. REV. 747, 762, 770
(citing Mark V. Tushnet, Diatribe, 78 MICH. L. REV. 694 (1980), and Mark V. Tushnet,
The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 411 (1981), for same).
Several sections of Tribe's American Constitutional Law that call for citation to a
critical minority or radical feminist writer are notably devoid of them. Tribe's
treatment of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), includes no reference
to his colleague Derrick Bell's path-breaking article, Brown v. Board of Education and
the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARv. L. REv. 518, 523-26 (1980), in which Bell
argues that Brown was decided not so much as a matter of conscience by the white
establishment, but rather to forward economic and Cold War imperatives important
to our ruling elite. See TRIBE, supra, at 1475-80, 1488-90, 1499, 1514. Tribe's section
on pornography and feminism mentions only Catharine MacKinnon and Susan
Estrich among legal feminists; Cass Sunstein (a man) is cited more often. See id. at
920-28. Neither the idea that the Constitution was an anti-black instrument, an idea
put forward by Bell and Thurgood Marshall among others, nor the thesis by Olsen,
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and incomplete picture of the debate about liberalism's defects.3 1
It results, for example, in the kind of textbook on civil rights legisla-
tion, recently updated by Theodore Eisenberg and published by
Michie, where nearly every inner-circle author is cited yet among
modern feminists only one grudging "see generally" cite is given to
Martha Minow and a "see" cite is given to Vicky Schultz.3 2 The
MacKinnon, and others, that the law is inherently anti-female, is mentioned.
This treatment stands in marked contrast to those who argue that racism affects
our entire political and legal systems, and hence anti-racist thought and commentary
should be brought into every area of constitutional discussion, not just equal
protection. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Constitution in Context, 63 COLO. L. REV.
(forthcoming 1992); Stephen Feldman, Whose Common Good? Racism in the Political
Community, 80 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 1992). To the extent these observations are
valid, Tribe's omissions become glaring. As evidence, consider that American
Constitutional Law contains no index entries for legitimation, Critical Race Theory,
patriarchy, hierarchy, hegemony, indeterminacy, or deconstruction. Gramsd,
Foucault, Habermas, Marcuse, and Marx are not mentioned at all.
" Derrick Bell, for example, argues that our system of anti-discrimination laws
and rules is not only manipulable and prone to backsliding but also designed to
operate that way. See DERRICK A. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987). Catharine
MacKinnon argues that the legal system is inherently biased against women and that
applying sex-neutral and race-neutral concepts of fairness and equal protection will
only exacerbate the law's biases. See CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED:
DISCOuRsES ON LIFE AND LAW 104-05, 164-66 (1987); CATHARINE MACKINNON,
TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 163 (1989). These sources would have
more vividly conveyed to Tribe's readers the growing disenchantment among outsider
writers with formalism in constitutional thought. For recent treatment of liberalism's
defects, see THE POLcS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David Kairys ed., 2d
ed. 1990) [hereinafter POLITICS OF LAW]; Symposium, The Critique of Normativity, 139
U. PA. L. REV. 801 (1991); see also Richard Delgado, Enormous Anomaly? Left-Right
Parallels in Recent WritingAbout Race, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1547, 1553-60 (1991) (book
review) (discussing four recent books and their criticism of liberalism).
32 See THEODORE EISENBERG, CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION 924, 1207 (3d ed. 1991)
(citing Martha Minow, Learning to Live with the Dilemma of Difference: Bilingual and
Special Education, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1985, at 157, and Vicky Schultz,
Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation In the
Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1749 (1990)). The 1700-page casebook contains hundreds of references to works by
white men, including several by the author himself. But the section on sexual
harassment of women in the workplace lacks any reference to MacKinnon's
groundbreaking work, CATHARINE MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979). See EISENBERG, supra, at 893-900.
Additionally, the sole treatment of discrimination against Mexican-Americans is an
excerpt from a relatively old article by two white men, Gary A. Greenfield & Don B.
Kates,Jr., Mexican Americans, Racial Discrimination, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866,63
CAL. L. REv. 662 (1975). See EISENBERG, supra, at 104. Eisenberg overlooked work
by authors such as Olivas, Palacios, Lopez, Reynoso, and Torres, none of whom are
cited anywhere in the book. For examples of these authors' work, see MICHAEL A.
OLIvAS, THE DILEMMA OF ACCESS: MINORITIES IN Two YEAR COLLEGES (1979);
Richard Delgado & Vicky Palacios, Mexican-Americans As a Legally Cognizable Class
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impression that could be received from reading these otherwise
impressive works is that the liberal system of law and politics that
has reigned since 1930 is largely intact and that he challengers are
doing little more than raising variations on a familiar theme.
2. The Latter-Day Imperialists
There comes a time when most scholars can no longer ignore
the work being done by previously excluded writers.ss Then, two
possible responses exist. One is thoughtful inclusion of the
previously excluded work. The other is limited, grudging, or
calculated acceptance, coupled with resort to an arsenal of mecha-
nisms to reduce its impact. The old-line, inner-circle scholars have
employed three types of mechanisms to lessen the "threat" of
insurgent scholarship; newcomers to he field have developed even
more.3
4
Mechanism one: Oh Yes, Before I Forget: The Afterthought. One
way to acknowledge outsider scholarship without fully assimilating
it is to cite it at the end of a string citation. In the main text the
author can continue to rely on the familiar list of friends and
acquaintances, saving reference to critical scholarship for a
footnote, frequently of the "see generally" or "see also" variety.
s5
under Rule 23 and the Equal Protection Clause, 50 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 393 (1974);
Gerald P. Lopez, The Idea of a Constitution in the Chicano Tradition, 37J. LEGAL EDUC.
162 (1987); Leo M. Romero et al., The Legal Education of Chicano Students: A Study in
Mutual Accomodation and Cultural Conflict, 5 N.M. L. REV. 177 (1975); Gerald Torres,
Local Knowledge, Local Color: Critical Legal Studies and the Law of Race Relation, 25 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1043 (1988). Critical Race Theorists, such as Mari Matsuda and
Patricia Williams, are conspicuously absent, and the main excerpt on sex discrimina-
tion and Title VII is an article written by a white man. See EISENBERG, supra, at 863-
71 (excerpting Richard A. Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An
Approach to the Topics, 24 UCLA L. REV. 581 (1977)). The only African-American
author whose name I recognize is Drew Days. See EISENBERG, supra, at 764 n.10
(citing Days, supra note 15).
33 This time seems to have arrived in civil rights scholarship. See supra note 15.
34 1 discuss the latters' response infra Part II. Joanna Russ found a similar
tendency to rely on a few recurring mechanisms for suppressing insurgent writing.
Her classic,JOANNA Russ, HOW TO SUPPRESS WOMEN'S WRITING (1983), examines the
techniques literary scholars have used throughout the 19th and 20th centuries to
belittle literature by women.
35 See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J.
453, 466 n.23 (1989). In the main text Ackerman uses Owen Fiss as an example of
a collectivist who stresses the rights of disadvantaged groups to equal treatment. But
in his footnote to Owen Fiss, Ackerman mentions that Catharine MacKinnon has
"more recently developed and deepened this group-oriented perspective in SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979), and TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE
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This approach allows the author to show that he is familiar with the
new work, while avoiding fully accounting for it in his analysis. The
approach also conveys the message that minority or feminist writing
is deservedly obscure, and thus worthy only of passing mention.
Mechanism two: The Stereotypical Dismissal. An established author
can dismiss a troublesome radical by caricaturing her or appealing
to the reader's pre-existing assumptions about her writings without
treating those writings seriously.6 Alternatively, the author can
merely call the new voices utopian, daring, "interesting," or not
really doing law. 7 These approaches enable the writer to avoid
confronting what the criticalist is saying. The teeth of the criticism
are thus drawn, and it emerges in more innocuous form than if it
had remained unmentioned.
Mechanism three: I'm So Hip. The Establishment writer cites to
his familiar inner circle for 95% of his article. Then, for a proposi-
tion or section that cries out for citation to a Critical Race Theorist
or feminist, the author will cite to one: Gee, aren't I hip! The
author appears to be recognizing and assimilating outsider scholar-
ship, when he is actually doing little to integrate such scholarship
into his own.38 For example, a scholar writing or teaching about
STATE (1989)." Id. Why, then, is MacKinnon not in the main text in place of or
along with Owen Fiss? Patricia Cain argues that citation to feminists is absent,
dismissive, or trivializing. See Cain, supra note 1.
3
6 See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, The Bicentennial of the Jurisprudence of Original Intent:
The Recent Past, 77 CAL. L. REv. 235, 257 (1989) (dismissing Unger by making light
of his "CLS shock troops," who began to preach original intent when they discovered
the Declaration of Independence, causing conservatives to leave by the rear door after
first pronouncing themselves "Original Original Intentionists"); Paul D. Carrington,
Of Law and the River, 34J. LEGAL EDUC. 222, 227 (1984) (stating that Critical Legal
Studies writers are preaching anti-law and that to be consistent with their own
premises, they should leave the academy); Lino A. Graglia, Permissible and Impermissi-
ble Content-Based Restrictions on Freedom of Speech, 10 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 67, 71-
72 (1987) (arguing that MacKinnon's work is little more than feminist propaganda
and that its adoption by two cities is "the best argument against democracy I have
heard in some time").
37 See e.g., Carrington, supra note 36 (stating that CLS writers are impassioned
and audacious but not really doing law, are poor influences on their students, and
should consider transferring to other university departments); see also infra notes 70-
72 and accompanying text (discussing marginalizing writing by placing outsider
writing in a category of its own).
38 See, e.g., Paul Brest, Affirmative Action and the Constitution: Three Theories, 72
IOWA L. REv. 281,281 n.2 (1987) (citing no minority scholar or woman and only one
criticalist, Alan Freeman, in an article about a racially-based and gender-based policy).
Although Alan Freeman advanced and documented the astonishing proposition that
Supreme Court anti-discrimination law negatively affects persons of color, see Alan
D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A
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developments in evidence law considers feminist thought only in
connection with his treatment of rape. He writes the rest of his
article or teaches the rest of his course as he has always done-
linearly, hierarchically, and with little thought to its impact on
women or the poor.
3 9
3. Those on the Road to Damascus
Some original inner-circle authors have accepted and incorporat-
ed the writings of the Critical Race Theorists and feminists. Instead
of dismissing their writings or ignoring them outright, the main-
stream author engages their propositions or ideas in a forthright
manner.40 When an author raises an issue from outsider scholar-
ship and takes the time to discuss his agreement or disagreement
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049, 1052-119 (1978),
Brest cites Freeman for the obscure proposition that "fault" theories of racial justice
are in question. See Brest, supra, at 281 n.2. In Brest's discussion of theories
justifying affirmative action, he does not cite writers of color, such as Bell, who have
expressed grave misgivings over the doctrine, its footing, and its intentions, see BELL,
supra note 31, at 146-61.
Even conscientious authors such as Frank Michelman are occasionally guilty of
dropping the isolated, fashionable citation. See Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97
YALE L.J. 1493, 1496 n.10 (1988). In an early footnote he cites some of the Critical
Race Theorists and feminists to illustrate the problems of exclusion and the stigma
of"otherness"; he does not, however, cite to any of them for their equally important
works on what to do about the problem of white race consciousness. For examples
of these works see BELL, supra note 31 (explaining the alternatives of litigation,
emigration, disruption, moral appeals and exhortation, self-help, and partisan
politics); Barnes, supra note 15, at 1869-70 (defending the need for Critical Race
scholars to search for truth by speaking from their experiences in response to the
traditional white-male,Judeo-Christian centered perspective). The remainder of the
article does not consider these writers again, except for a brief cite to MacKinnon on
pornography and on Roe v. Wade, see Michelman, supra, at 1532 n.161, 1534 n.170.
Robert O'Neil, an author who earlier conceded that I had a point about imperial
scholarship, see Robert M. O'Neil, A Reaction to the Imperial Scholar and Professor
Delgado's Proposed Solution, 3 L. & INEQ.J. 255 (1985), cites no minority and only two
women in his piece on Bakke and DeFunis. See O'Neil, supra note 19. Like Brest,
O'Neil ignores the many scholars of color who have written in this area, preferring
to cite ancient articles and books by himself, Gellhorn, Epstein, and other white men.
See id. at 423-30 nn.2-22.
39 See MCCORMICK ON EvIDENCE 83 n.92 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. Supp.
1987) (citing article by Massaro on rape trauma syndrome; otherwise, feminists are
not much in evidence); see also supra note 31 (demonstrating tokenistic citation
practices); infra notes 68-74 and accompanying text (same).
40 Se, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Expression and the
Subordination of Groups, 1990 U. ILL. L. REv. 95, 114 n.73 (citing Derrick Bell,
Kimberle Crenshaw, and Charles Lawrence as authority for various propositions
having to do with the continuing menace of racism).
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with it, he is recognizing its validity and relevance; it is not simply
brushed aside or ignored.41
This thoughtful treatment of outsider scholarship encourages
expansion of the civil rights canon, which indeed recognizes the
current condition of civil rights scholarship.42 In that sense, it
constitutes an awareness on the part of these members of the inner
circle that civil rights writing has not really been composed of two
separate strains but rather of parallel traditions that must inevitably
lose their Euclidean separateness and become one integrated
tradition. There is nothing magical about this merging. It is a
matter of scholarship as usual; relevant, important work exists,
which is read, criticized, and cited. The only thing remarkable
about this scholarship as usual is that, in law, in a few places, it is
finally happening.
II. THE NEW GENERATION: THE IMPERIAL SCHOLAR UPDATED
In The Imperial Scholar, I found that the bulk of writing in the
areas of equality and civil rights was done by a small circle of
approximately two dozen white male scholars writing in the top
reviews and teaching at the top law schools.43 Part I of this Article
examined the later careers and output of these same scholars,
finding that some scholars have continued their old ways while
others have reformed. Still others have grudgingly or halfheartedly
adjusted to the new writing by adopting tokenistic citation mecha-
nisms such as The Afterthought, Stereotypical Dismissal, and I'm So
Hip.
44
Since I began writing The Imperial Scholar ten years ago,
however, newcomers have arrived on the scene. Many of these are
white; most are males; some have brought reputations achieved in
other areas of the law. This Part examines these new writers and
their citation practices. As with the old-line group, I find that a few
of the new scholars are relatively egalitarian in their scholarship,
citing Critical Race Theorists and radical feminists about as
41 See, e.g., id. at 114 (agreeing with outsiders that racism still exists and is a
current issue); Alan Freeman, Radsm, Rights and the Quest for Equality of Opportunity:
A CriticalLegal Essay, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 295, 331 & n.94 (1988) (mentioning
Mari Matsuda in the main text of his article and also detailing in the footnote why he
disagrees with her proposition that real experiences cannot be paradoxical).
42 See supra notes 10-12, 15 and accompanying text (stating that legal scholarship
is diversifying and that the canon is expanding to include new voices and approaches).
43 See The Imperial Scholar, supra note 1, at 562 n.3.
44 See supra Part I.B.2.
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frequently as one might fairly expect.45  Some new scholars,
however, steadfastly rely on Frank Michelman, Owen Fiss, and other
familiar stalwarts.46 A third group is for my purposes the most
fascinating. This group, the neo-imperialist scholars, has deployed
an almost baroque variety of ways to minimize, marginalize, co-opt,
soften, miss the point of, selectively ignore, or generally devalue the
new insurgent writers.
Mechanisms four and five: The hero, the zero. As with the original
inner-circle scholars, the new majority-race writers have their heroes
and zeroes. Duncan Kennedy, Alan Freeman, Alex Aleinikoff, and
Gary Peller cite the new voices appropriately, sometimes agreeing
and sometimes taking issue with them.47 Other new entrants,
however, either ignore the insurgent scholars or treat their work
diffidently. One dynamic young, majority-race writer, for example,
in a long, heavily footnoted article refers to dozens of white male
writers, but collects works by women and minority authors in a
single footnote, making little effort to distinguish, quote, or refer to
particular passages from them.48  Another author offers two
"special interest" references, one for feminists and one for Critical
Race Theorists.49 In an article on slavery and slave law, a third
entrant only once cites to Bell's Race, Racism and American Law, a
standard work-5 -she cites Sunstein, Tushnet, Tribe, and Bickel
more-and at no time mentions Leon Higginbotham's well-regarded
history, In the Matter of Color.51 A fourth wrote a stinging footnote
chastising a number of the new-voice authors for dangerous reliance
on notions of class-based harm and redress.52 Unlike some, this
45 See infra note 47 and accompanying text (describing "heroes" among the new
writers).
46 See The Imperial Scholar, supra note 1, at 562 n.3 (describing the original in-
group).
4See; e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 30 (citing numerous new-voice authors);
Freeman, supra note 41 (same); Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for
Affirmative Action in Legal Academia, 1990 DUKE L.J. 705 (same); Gary Peller, Race
Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758 (same); see also Cain, supra note 1 (listing Sunstein,
Tobias, Chused, Karst, Michelman, and Posner as men who have taken women's
writing seriously).
48 See Edward L. Rubin, The Concept of Law and the New Public Law Scholarship, 89
MICH. L. REv. 792, 811 n.55 (1991). Randall Kennedy criticized Rubin for ignoring
Critical Race Theory in an earlier article. See Kennedy, supra note 11, at 1748 n.18.
49 SeeJ.M. Balkin, Ideology as Constraint, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1133, 1148 n.59, 1149
nn.61-62 (1991) (book review).
50 See VanderVelde, supra note 15, at 497 n.267.
51 See A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE
AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1978).
52 See David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by
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author at least cited oppositional scholars for a proposition, if only
to attack it.
Mechanism six: "Yeah, yeah"; No need to tell me more. Many of the
new writers in the field of civil rights cite work by women and
minorities as perfunctorily as the old-timers do,53 but with a
difference. That difference consists of citing an early page of an
article or book-for example, page three, not 403. When an author
does this regularly, it raises the suspicion that he has not bothered
to read the entire article or book, but has merely leafed through the
article's preface or introduction in search of a general proposition
he can cite with a minimum of effort.54 The author discharges his
obligation to refer to the new voices but avoids the hard work of
reading the entire piece and dealing with it seriously. The number
of references to the middle or latter pages of Catharine MacKin-
non's writing on pornography is much smaller than the number of
references to its opening pages, a treatment some other radical
feminists receive as well.55 Women will recognize this treatment
as a conversational gambit many men use-interruption. The male
listens to a woman's opening words, then bursts in to finish her
sentence, saying "Yeah, yeah. I get it; no need to go on... now,
what do you think about my idea?"56 Derrick Bell also garners
references of this sort.
57
Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561, 562 n.5 (1987).
53 See supra text accompanying note 35 (describing Mechanism one: The
Afterthought).
4 For examples of such early-page citation, see Neal Devins, GenderJustice and Its
Critics, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1377, 1382 n.27, 1385 n.36, 1389 n.62, 1390 nn.63 & 65
(1988) (book review) (citing to early passages of MacKinnon's and Minow's works);
Suzanna Sherry, An Essay Concerning Toleration, 71 MINN. L. REV. 963, 988 n.113
(1987) (mentioning MacKinnon's work on pornography legislation but not bothering
to cite it); id. at 988 n.114 (providing full citation to a male author on pornography).
55 See, e.g., Edward Rubin, Television and the Experience of Citizenship, 68 TEX. L.
REV. 1155, 1155 n.3 (1990) (citing to early pages of MacKinnon's works); Suzanna
Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 72 VA. L. REv.
543, 565 n.98, 586 n.182 (1986) (citing to Fran Olsen's work in its entirety or to its
early pages); Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the
Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1161, 1175
n.73 (1988) (citing male authors to particular pages and female authors to entire
chapters or works).
V6 Se4 e.g., DEBORAH TANNEN, You JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND: WOMEN AND MEN
IN CONVERSATION 188-216 (1990) (detailing the use and the perception of interrup-
tions by men and women).
17 See e.g., Randolph D. Moss, Participation and Department of Justice School
Desegregation Consent Decrees, 95 YALE LJ. 1811, 1827 n.83 (1986) (citing to Bell's
entire work). This is also an example of the "I'm So Hip" mechanism. See supra
notes 38-39 and accompanying text. Moss cites Fiss, Tribe, Eisenberg, and Michelman
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Mechanism seven: "I know":• The facile (and safe) translation. This
mechanism translates a novel, hard-edged, and discomfiting thesis
by an outside writer so that it becomes familiar, safe, and tame.
Often the translation forces the thesis into liberal-legalist terms that
were intended to be avoided. For example, some scholars translate
MacKinnon's work on pornography into an intriguing First
Amendment question.58 MacKinnon does not consider pornogra-
phy a First Amendment question, but a near-crime, a civil rights
offense against women.5 9 Once translated into a First Amendment
framework her proposal loses much of its urgency and original
character.
60
Mechanism eight: "I loved Dan's idea." A number of the new
writers show familiarity with ideas feminists and Critical Race
Theory scholars have been proposing, but either forget where they
extensively about the role of the executive branch in the structural reform of
desegregation law, the participation of those involved in determining desegregation
procedures, and the weakness ofindividuals as opposed to powerful institutions such
as school systems. Meanwhile, Derrick A. Bell Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration
Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976), is
cited in its entirety in note 83 in a "compare, e.g.," citation for the baleful proposition
that civil rights organizations have convinced themselves that Brown stands for
desegregation and not education. This and one other "see Bell, supra" cite are the
only citations to voices of color in the article. It is as though the author decided he
needed a "minority cite," knew what that minority cite should propose, and went out
and found it. See also Kenneth L. Karst, Citizenship, Race, and Marginality, 30 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1, 29 n.123 (1988) (citing Bell's Foreword at page four).
Like Moss, Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of
Abortion, 84 Nw. U.L. REV. 480 (1990), uses not only perfunctory citation but also the
"I'm So Hip" mechanism. Koppelman cites to almost no authors of the critical
persuasion in the bulk of his article, but cites Susan Estrich and Catharine MacKinnon
when discussing abortion in cases of rape. See id. at 504 n.104. In notes 109 and 111
he also cites MacKinnon-to a page that is only five pages from the cite in note 104.
Apart from these citations and one reference to Adrienne Rich in note 113, no Crits,
Critical Race Theory scholars, or radical feminists appear in the article.
58 See TRIBE, supra note 30, at 920-25 (approaching MacKinnon's Indianapolis
ordinance as a First Amendment problem); Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and theFirst
Amendment, 1986 DuKE L.J. 589, 589-627 (analyzing anti-pornography legislation
under the First Amendment and concluding that it is constitutional if narrowly aimed
at immediate harms to women).
59 See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
321, 321-45 (1984) (discussing the way that pornography institutionalizes inequality
against women); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 1 (1985) (same). To be sure, criminalization of
pornography that degrades women has a First Amendment dimension, but to treat
it, as some do, exclusivelyunder that rubric is to miss much of MacKinnon's message.
60 See Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harassment
and the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. LJ. 481 (1991) (treating various proposals to
regulate hate-speech as first amendment problems exclusively).
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heard them,61 or cite a derivative source-a critic, or a majority-
race commentator-to summarize outsider views. For example,
some scholars rely on Randall Kennedy, a critic of Critical Race
Theory, for a summary of Critical Race Theory positions;62 others
cite men such as Cass Sunstein for radical feminist views developed
by Catharine MacKinnon and others.63 One writer cited Deborah
Rhode for "reasoning from the bottom,"64 a view associated at
least as much with Mari Matsuda.
65
This approach corresponds to another experience familiar to
most women: co-optation. A woman proposes an idea; no one in
the group reacts. Twenty minutes later, a male restates and puts
forward the same suggestion, which immediately wins widespread
praise and thereafter becomes "Dan's idea."
66
Mechanism nine: "I know just how you must have felt". Co-optation
of others' experience. Some of the new writers, and a few of the
original ones, make an effort to identify with the stories and
accounts the outsider narrativists are offering, but in a way that co-
opts or minimizes these stories.67 The majority-race author draws
a parallel between something in the experience of the outsider
author and something that happened to him.68 There is nothing
61 See Derrick Bell & Richard Delgado, Minority Law Professors' Lives: The Bell-
Delgado Survey, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 349, 357-58 (1989) (discussing selective
forgetfulness).
62 See, e.g., Lloyd Cohen, A Different Black Voice in Legal Scholarship, 37N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. (forthcoming 1992) (describing Randall Kennedy's critique of Bell, Delgado,
and Matsuda).
63 See e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 30 (citing Steve Smith with regard to feminism-a
rare lapse because the author cites Matsuda, Olsen, Guinier, and MacKinnon
elsewhere in the article); Alex M.Johnson, Jr., The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE L.J.
2007,2023 (1991) ("According to Sunstein, the difference strand of Critical Feminist
Theory is.... ."); Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 15 n.60 (1989) (citing Sunstein for the principle of difference, which is
commonly associated with feminist authors).
64 See Aleinikoff, supra note 30.
65 See MariJ. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations,
22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987); see also MariJ. Matsuda, Public Response to
Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320 (1989) (advocating
sensitivity toward outgroups victimized by hate-speech).
66 1 am not saying that men may not write about women's experience or whites
about those of people of color. I am saying that it is nice also to cite the originator
of an idea. Moreover, often the original version will be more vivid and detailed than
that of a paraphraser or interpreter, and hence offer the best exposition of the view
in question.
67 For a sparkling, if somewhat acerbic, treatment of this issue, see Trina Grillo
& Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The Implication of Making
Comarisons Between Racism and Sexism (or other -isms), 1991 DuKE L.J. 397, 401-12.
Perhaps he was insulted for being short or excluded from a Little League team
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wrong with using analogies and metaphors to deal with the
experience of others for that is how we extend our sympathies. If,
however, we analogize to refocus a conversation or an article
towards ourselves exclusively, something is wrong, especially if the
experience to which we liken another's is manifestly less serious.
For example, the author of one article on campus racial harassment
observes that everyone experiences "insulting" or "upsetting" speech
at one time or another, so what is so special about the racist
version?
69
Mechanism ten: "Pure poetry": How poignant, touching, or moving-
Placing outsider writing on a pedestal. Some writers of majority race
praise the new writing for its passionate or emotional quality. The
writing is so personal, so colorful, so poetic, so "moving."70 This
approach can marginalize outsider writing by placing it in a category
of its own. Women and minority writers feel more deeply than we;
they have "soul." T1 The writing is evaluated as a journal of the
author's individual thoughts and feelings, not as an article that
delivers uncomfortable insights and truths about society and
injustice.
72
for lack of athletic ability. See id. at 400-01. I am reminded also of the Clarence
Thomas-Anita Hill hearings, in which the nominee succeeded in depicting himself as
the victim of harassment.
69 See Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?,
1990 DUKE L.J. 484, 537 (demonstrating the trite 'no exceptions' argument with the
statement that "[to attempt to craft free speech exceptions only for racist speech
would create a significant risk of a slide down the proverbial 'slippery slope'").70 Joanna Russ discusses false categorizing as a mechanism to diminish women's
writing. See Russ, supra note 34, at 49-61.
71 See the following reviews of Derrick Bell's book, And We Are Not Saved: Kevin
E. Kennedy, Book Review, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1130, 1131 (1988) (using terms "stirring"
and "poignant" to describe Bell's book); Peter M. Yu, Book Review, 23 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 287, 289 (1988) (using terms such as "embellished by the speculation of
fiction," "poignan[t]," and "potent"); see also Wendy Kaminer, Citizens of the
Supermarket State, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1991, § 7 (Book Review), at 10 (reviewing
PATRICIA J. WILLIAMs, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1990)) (stating that
Patricia Williams writes with "eloquence" and "passion"). There is nothing wrong
with writing powerfully, nor with praising writing that is clean or graphic, but we
must not allow our fascination with the vividness of a passage to distract us from the
author's meaning, as some do with Critical Race Theory scholarship.
72 In a contrary mechanism, the author may purport to agree with the writer's call
for reform but take issue with the tone in which it is written. It may be dismissed as
too despairing, see Alan D. Freeman, Race and Class, 90 YALE L.J. 1880 (1981)
(reviewing DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1980));
too militant, see Kennedy, supra note 11, at 1808, 1815, or too extreme, see O'Neil,
supra note 38. Is this Article, for example, audacious or disrespectful? It does speak
directly, invents pungent labels for the various mechanisms, and names certain
IMPERIAL SCHOLAR REVISITED
Mechanism eleven: Assimilation/co-optation-"We have been saying
this all along." This mechanism dismisses the feminists and Critical
Race Theorists as saying little new; we have been making the same
points about brotherhood, equality, and civility for hundreds, if not
thousands, of years. Plato, Aquinas, Austin, Unger, and any favorite
male author urged that society be arranged justly and that all should
be treated with respect.73 On some level, every truth is foreshad-
owed by or included in every other. Yet one might argue that
earlier authorities wrote inadequately and spoke poorly to our
condition because that condition persists today. If outsider voices
are addressing new or old grievances in new ways, one ought not
dismiss what they are saying merely because someone else previous-
ly said something remotely similar.74
Mechanism twelve: "She wrote just one" (And I'll cite it, too). Some
of the mainstream authors treat the new voices as though each of
them had written exactly one article or book.75  Susan Estrich is
authors who use them. Yet, an audacious message may require, or at leastjustify, an
audacious vehicle. Audacity is also a matter of perspective. While some might find
some types of Critical writing audacious, it may be more audacious to suggest hat the
rights of whites not to associate with Blacks are equal in weight to the rights of Blacks
to associate with whites, see Herbert Wechsler, TowardNeutralPrinciples of Constitution-
at Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20-35 (1959); that the free-speech right of a racist to hurl
invective trumps the right of the victim to be free from receiving it, see Richard
Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-
Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982); or that affirmative action sacrifices
innocent whites in favor of unqualified Blacks. On "innocent" whites and non-
innocentblacks, see Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Chronicle, 102 YALE L.J. (forthcoming
1992).
73 See Mark Kelman, Concepts of Discrimination in "General Ability"Job Testing, 104
HARV. L. REV. 1158, 1233-34 (1991) (stating that informality increases risk of
prejudice, as various Critical Race Theory writers have argued, but "[o]f course, this
position has long been taken by some white male critical legal studies scholars as
well"); see also Cain, supra note 1 (describing the "what's new" response to feminist
writers, in which the author points out that a feminist's work is like other radical
theory, or contains nothing original); Martha Minow, Beyond Universality, 1989 U. CmI.
LEGAL F. 115, 129 (same observation).
74 For an example of this type of dismissiveness, see Kaminer, supra note 71, at
10 (implying that Williams uses fancy vocabulary and arcane language to reiterate the
obvious fact that racism is bad).
75 See, e.g., Stephen M. Feldman, Exposing Sunstein's Naked Preferences, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 1335, 1353 n.87, 1354 n.93, 1355 n.97, 1356 n.99 (citing to Derrick Bell and
myself for one predictable work each); Linda R. Hirshman, Bronte, Bloom, and Bork:
An Essay on the Moral Education ofJudges, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 177, 202 n.160, 205
n.178, 217 n.240, 222 n.272, 224 n.285 (1988) (citing MacKinnon for one predictable
work);James S. Liebman, Implementing Brown in the Nineties: Political Reconstruction,
Liberal Recollection, and Litigatively Enforced Legislative Reform, 76 VA. L. REv. 349,356
n.37, 359 n.51 (1990) (citing Bell for one predictable work).
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cited for her book on rape,76 Man Matsuda for Looking to the
Bottom,77 Derrick Bell for And We Are Not Saved,78 me for The
Imperial Scholar.7 9 Each of these writers has written many works,
arguably of comparable merit to the one cited."0 Routinized,
stereotypical citation to one work gives the impression the author
wrote only the one. It also conveys the message that insurgent
writers can only write one work, probably an anomaly, the result of
a gigantic effort or internal convulsion that they are capable of
producing only once in a lifetime.
8 1
Mechanism thirteen: The all-purpose citation. The author has a
flash of insight, into the way constitutional equality works, for
example. Midway through the article it dawns on the author that he
had better cite a minority. What better place to do so than for the
proposition that (1) racism is terrible, (2) discrimination still exists,
or (3) we all must work really hard at dealing with it. Most authors
of color surely say these things somewhere, so the author chooses
one-how about Crenshaw?
8 2
III. "AT THE MARGIN": WHY WE ALWAYS FAIL
To RECOGNIZE NEW STORIES
Even though the new voices are finding their way into the pages
of the top reviews and journals, they are not being quickly and
easily integrated into the conversations and dialogues of traditional
legal scholarship. Some of the resistance may be intentional and
mean-spirited-why should I cite that outsider, after the nasty things
she said about me or my friends?8 3 Resistance may also be the
76 SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987).
77 Matsuda, supra note 65.
78 BELL, supra note 31.
79 The Imperial Scholar, supra note 1.
80 See Russ, supra note 34, at 62-75 (Chapter 7-Isolation) (describing a similar
phenomena in women's literature-"she wrote it, but she only wrote one of it").
81 See id. at 69-75 (describing the phenomenon of women being categorized as
something other than writers, or else as occasional abored imposters).
82 See Michel Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action and the Elusive
Meaning of Constitutional Equality, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1729 (1989). The author rolls
merrily along his jurisprudential way, citing Fiss, Bickel, Dworkin, Ely, and then brings
in Kimberle Crenshaw for the only cite to a Critical Race Theory figure in the entire
article. The proposition he cites her for? "Thus, for example, if the racist portrays
blacks as being lazy and irresponsible... ." Id. at 1768 n.183. Surely Crenshaw had
something more vital to say about our system of white-over-black subordination than
that racists often portray blacks as lazy and irresponsible. Also, one would presume
that more than one minority scholar has something relevant and significant to say
about affirmative action.
83 For examples of the hostility Critical Race Theory has generated, see Rothfeld,
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product of inflexibility and an unwillingness to entertain new
positions-I'm forty-five years old; why do I have to read all these
new authors anyway?
84
But most mainstream legal writers are neither mean-spirited nor
lazy. I think the most likely explanation for most of the mechanisms
I have detailed lies elsewhere. Legal scholarship is currently
radically transforming itself.85 Formalism and case-crunching
notes and articles running 100 pages or more, littered with
hundreds of footnotes, are passing into history.86 Even legal
process and interdisciplinary "law and" scholarship have lost much
of their momentum. In their places a subtler yet audacious form of
legal writing has appeared, with roots in postmodernism, critical
thought, and narrative theory.87 The authors, format, and authori-
ties cited are radically different from those that came before. If not
a full-fledged paradigm shift, something similar seems to be
happening. As sociologists of knowledge have pointed out, such
shifts are at first resisted by those steeped in the old regime; the
paradigm changes only when the costs of resisting it become
unacceptable compared to the gains of adopting the new one.
8 8
supra note 12; Wiener, supra note 2; Micaela diLeonardo & Adolph L. Reed Jr.,
'Academic Poverty-Pimping' NATION, Oct. 23, 1989, at 442 (categorizing certain
African-American scholarship as "muddle-headed, self-aggrandizing slop"). But see
Rothfeld, supra note 12, at B6 (describing the remarks of Kenneth Karst, a professor
who was singled out as an inner-circle member, who called the new movement
"inevitable" and "a kind of growth").
8 See, e.g., Rothfeld, supra note 12, at B6 (citing an anonymous law professor, who
stated that new minority writers do not "advance legal scholarship" by mere story-
telling and that genuine scholarship is the sort of thing one could cite in a brief to
Justice O'Connor).
85 See, e.g., Symposium, The Critique of Normativity, supra note 31 (describing the
change in tenor of legal scholarship away from routine normative work and toward
more skeptical and self-reflective analyses of legal cultures and thought); Richard
Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L.
REv. 2411 (1989) (describing Critical Race Theory and other "outgroup literature");
Jean Stefancic & Richard Delgado, OutsiderJurisprudence and the Electronic Revolution:
Will Technology Help or Hinder the Cause of Law Reform?, 52 OHIo ST. L.J. 847 (1991)
(discussing the change in legal scholarship through the writing of Critical Race
Theory scholars and electronic technology).
86 See Richard Delgado, Moves, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1071, 1072-75 (1991); see also
Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere To Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167 (1991) (characteriz-
ing all of the dominant genre of legal scholarship as empty and passe).87 See e.g., Delgado, supra note 85; see also POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 31
(containing a collection of articles produced by criticalists and outsiders).
88 The classic work describing this phenomenon is THOMAS KUHN, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970); see also Delgado, supra note 86,
at 1073 ("Paradigms change when everyone realizes ... that [the new paradigm's]
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Resistance to the new voices, then, may be as natural as that which
the Langdellians and "mechanical jurisprudes" raised to legal
realism early in this century. All change is costly. What more
natural reaction than postponing dealing with it as long as possi-
ble?8 9
A second, related explanation applies insights from narrative
theory.9 0 As many have pointed out, reality comes to us not as a
given but in terms of narratives, mindsets, or stories-interpretive
structures by which we construct and come to terms with the world
of reality.9 1 Each of us is the product of a large number of such
understandings, or "stories," by which we reduce the diversity of
daily life to manageable proportions. In a sense, we are our stock
of stories and they us.
92
When a feminist or Critical Race Theorist offers a radically new
story, we evaluate it in terms of the one we currently hold. If it
seems too different, we are apt to reject it as extreme, coercive,
political, harsh, or untrue.9 3  Imagine, for example, the reaction
of most liberal law students on hearing Derrick Bell's interest-
convergence hypothesis for the first time.94 The first response to
Bell's hypothesis is re-interpretation-softening or qualifying it
advantages outweight the costs of abandoning old assumptions."); Richard Delgado
&Jean Stefancic, Norms and Narratives: Can Judges Avoid Serious Moral Error?, 69 TEX.
L. REV. 1929,1929-34 (1991) (arguing that paradigms change slowly;judges rarely see
the dominant forms of injustice and racism of their times as troublesome).
'9 See generally Delgado, supra note 86, at 1072-74 (describing various ways in
which some scholars deal with the "new critique").
go For descriptions of narrative theory, see ON NARRATIVE (WJ.T. Mitchell ed.,
1981); 1 & 2 PAUL RICOEUR, TIME AND NARRATIVE (1984-85); Robin West,Jurispru-
dence as Narrative: An Aesthetic Analysis of Modern Legal Theory, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 145
(1985).
91 See Delgado, supra note 85, at 2411-16; Richard Delgado &Jean Stefancic, Why
Do We Tell The Same Storiest Law Reform, Critical Librarianship, and the Triple Helix
Dilemma, 42 STAN. L. REV. 207, 207-09 (1989); see also Steven L. Winter, Contingency
and Community in Normative Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 963,971-1002 (1991) (arguing
that structures of legal thought often determine content).
92 See supra notes 81-82 & 86. Jean Stefancic and I have explored the dark side
of this observation. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 88, at 1952-56.
93 See, e.g., Derrick Bell, The Price and Pain of Racial Perspective, STAN. L. SCH. J.,
May 8, 1986, at 5 (discussing a reaction by some Stanford Law School faculty to Bell's
teaching of constitutional law; faculty members offered supplemental classes to Bell's
students); see also Delgado, supra note 85, at 2413-16, 2435-38 (arguing that
internalized stories determine beliefs); Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 88, at 1933
(discussing resistance to new narratives).
94 See BELL, supra note 31, at 102-39. The formula holds that whites will support
or tolerate racial justice for blacks only when this coincides with white self-interest.
See also BELL, supra note 72, at 1-71 (describing the same hypothesis).
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because Bell could not have intended to interpret the search for
racial justice in such a scathing way. Yet for many radical race
reformers, the hypothesis seems commonplace and true.
Both mechanisms lead to a melancholy truth. We postpone
confronting novelty and change until they acquire enough momen-
tum that we are swept forward. We take seriously new social
thought only after hearing it so often that its tenets and themes
begin to seem familiar, inevitable, and true.9 5 We then adopt the
new paradigm, and the process repeats itself. We escape from one
mental and intellectual prison only into a larger slightly more
expansive one. Each jail-break is seen as illegitimate. We reject
new thought until, eventually, its hard edges soften, its suggestions
seem tame and manageable, and its proponents are "elder states-
persons," to be feared no longer.96 By then, of course, the new
thought has lost its radically transformative character. We reject the
medicine that could save us until, essentially, it is too late.
9 7
95 See Richard Delgado, Our Better Natures: A Revisionist View ofJoseph Sax's Public
Trust Theoi of Environmental Protection, and Some Dark Thoughts on the Possibility of Law
Reform, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1209, 1223-27 (1991) (arguing that we resist new thought
until it has lost its power to transform us).
96 See id. at 1223-26.
97 See id.; cf. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 91, at 222-25 (discussing how "[w]e
can sometimes break the cycle of repetitive thought and scholarship and achieve
genuine innovation"); see also Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 88, at 1930 ("Only
hindsight, benefitted by increased empathy and understanding, exposes an opinion
as monstrous, anomalous-a moral abomination.").
Do those who are advocating the new paradigm and attacking the old one
demonstrate the same clubby, self-citation vices, the same marginalizing techniques,
I have shown on the part of the old guard? An intriguing question, but I did not
explore it; my purpose was to identify mechanisms that interfere with legal and social
reform, not ones that interfere with stasis. I have the following general impressions:
(1) feminists and crits probably cite mainstream writers more often than they us,
because (a) there are many more of them, and (b) much of our scholarship is
concerned with the defects and hidden assumptions of majority culture, institutions,
and legal doctrine; (2) we probably cite nontraditional sources-Gramsci, each other,
W.E.B. DuBois, etc.-more often than do most mainstream writers; and (3) when we
do cite other crits and scholars of color in, say, 40% of the footnotes of an article, this
will strike many majority readers as troublesome (akin to the reaction some have on
entering a campus or high-school cafeteria: "Why are all the Blacks sitting together?"
failing, of course, to notice that the whites are doing that, as well).
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CONCLUSION
Nearly ten years ago in The Imperial Scholar I wrote of an inner
circle of white-male scholars who systematically excluded minority
voices from the central arenas of civil rights scholarship. Almost a
decade later many of the actors have changed, but the situation is
not greatly different. With a few notable exceptions both the
original group and the newcomers rely on a panoply of devices,
ranging from the dismissive Afterthought to the wishful Translation,
to muffle and tame the new voices.
Thus, although critical, feminist, and minority writers are
increasingly appearing in the pages of our top journals, they are still
not being integrated fully or easily into the colloquies, exchanges,
and dialogues of legal scholarship. Some of the resistance may be
intentional, but I believe most of it results from quite ordinary
forces: preference for the familiar, discomfort with impending
change, and a near-universal disdain for an account or "story" that
deviates too much from one upon which we have been relying to
construct and order our social world.
Cultural momentum tends to be preserved. All discourse
marginalizes. We resist transformative thought until it has lost the
power to transform us. If I am right, imperial scholarship will
continue to be with us a long time.
